For two hundred years, Americans have believed that they have an obligation to improve the lot of humanity, a belief that has consistently shaped U.S. foreign policy. Yet within this consensus, there are two competing schools of thought: the "exemplarist" school (Brands' term) which holds that what America chiefly owes the world is the benign example of a well-functioning democracy, and the "vindicationist" school which argues that force must sometimes supplement a good example. In this book, H.W. Brands traces the (...) evolution of these two schools as they emerged in the thinking and writing of the most important public thinkers of the past two centuries. (shrink)

This paper argues that spacetime visualisability is not a necessary condition for the intelligibility of theories in physics. Visualisation can be an important tool for rendering a theory intelligible, but it is by no means a sine qua non. The paper examines the historical transition from classical to quantum physics, and analyses the role of visualisability and its relation to intelligibility. On the basis of this historical analysis, an alternative conception of the intelligibility of scientific theories is proposed, based on (...) Heisenberg 's reinterpretation of the notion of Anschaulichkeit. (shrink)

The Oxford Classical Texts, or Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, are renowned for their reliability and presentation. The series consists of a text without commentary but with a brief apparatus criticus at the front of each page. There are now over 100 volumes, representing the greater part of classical Greek and Latin literature. The aim of the series remains that of including the works of all the principal classical authors. Although this has been largely accomplished, new volumes are still being published (...) to fill the remaining gaps, and old editions are being revised in the light of recent research or replaced. (shrink)

Bücheler assigns this epitaph to the Caesarian epoch: and it is clearly not of later date. The fifth line is corrupt. Bücheler suggests tentatively the insertion of the word dilecto after Cadmo. That will indeed give us a verse of six feet. But we shall not be much the happier. We shall still have to believe that a member of the gens Heluia married, circa 100&50 B.C, a husband of the name of Cadmus Scrateius. He must have been the public (...) executioner: for I know of no other Cadmus in Rome; and he bore no very good reputation, and very little deserved the epithet dilectus, for the commentators upon Horace 5. i. 6. 39 speak of him as ‘ notae crudelitatis.’ He must be supposed to have taken the name Scrateius to make himself more terrible. But where in all the Graeco-Roman world he found it, it is impossible to guess. (shrink)

W. H. Walsh; XII—Historical Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 63, Issue 1, 1 June 1963, Pages 217–236, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

Tarán’s case against the authenticity of Epinomis depends on the claim that it is incompatible with Plato’s Laws. Behind this claim is the uncritical assumption that the Athenian Stranger of Laws speaks for Plato. While the Athenian Stranger of Epinomis clearly does not do so, the same is equally true, albeit more difficult to detect, of the Stranger in Laws. Once the Athenian is recognized as both ambitious and impious, a reconstruction of the last sentence of Epinomis — on which (...) Tarán’s incompatibility thesis principally rests — reveals the theological-political continuity between the two dialogues: the Stranger is intent on bringing the city into being while securing divine sanction for his own code of laws and divine honours for himself. Plato appended the Epinomis to the Laws in order to make it easier for the student to recognize the Stranger’s intentions as well as to draw attention to Book VII of the Laws, the centre of the dialogue once Epinomis is recognized as its thirteenth book; it is here that the Stranger describes how a mathematical and astronomical man may become a god to other men. (shrink)

It is a widely held doctrine at the moment that metaphysical propositions are meaningless, are, in fact, not genuine propositions at all. This doctrine is supported by the contention that only propositions which are verifiable are significant: and it is held that metaphysical propositions do not fulfil this condition, and are consequently pseudo-propositions. Those who hold this view divide propositions into three classes: Tautologies; which are analytic, certain, and are guaranteed by the principle of contradiction. Factually significant propositions; which are (...) synthetic, hypothetical, and are capable of empirical verification. Pseudopropositions, which only appear to be propositions and are, in reality, meaningless nonsense. (shrink)